Introduction to Open Diplomacy

In our galactic sector we conduct diplomacy openly. That is to say what you might call the general public are never prevented from knowing what’s going on. Obviously not everyone is interested, but those who are will always have access. This way, if any so-called player in the game, so to speak, were to behave in a deplorable, selfish, or uncivilised way, then they would have to face the public’s reaction to that.

This, however, is never a problem. Perhaps precisely because diplomacy is conducted openly. It provides a deterrent, in other words. Mind you, all the spacefaring civilisations of which I am aware are psychosocially and emotionally mature anyway, and have a habit of considering the other party’s interests as much as their own, without having to be prompted to do so.

It seems to me that this is even more important here on Gaia. When diplomacy is conducted on Gaia it is invariably behind closed doors, and the public only get to see the end result. Thus, for example, if one side makes unreasonable demands there is no public reaction to force them to behave reasonably.

The fundamental, psychological, or psychosocial reasoning behind this is the simple fact that the majority of human beings are good people. They know the difference between good and evil, between reason and unreason, and would inevitably react strongly and forcefully on their own behalf if a diplomatic representative was behaving against their interests. Thus, for example, if I was to make a justified, reasonable demand, which is then rebutted by the other party for selfish reasons, then my next move would be to make a strongly worded and sufficiently publicised public statement, informing the people of the actions of that other party. The public would then, one hopes, put strong pressure on the other party to act unselfishly and do the right thing. This, in a sense, could also be seen as democratic diplomacy, given that those diplomats are supposed to represent their people.

The other, related, justification is found in the concept of game theory. One of the great failings of some game theoretical thinking is the underlying assumption that each player in the game is, in trying to maximise their own outcome, attempting to gain some kind of advantage over the other player. This assumption pits both players against each other from the outset, before negotiations have even begun, making it far harder for both of them to arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement.

What seems to me the clear and obvious solution to this is for both players to discard this antagonistic approach and cooperate for mutual benefit. In this way they will both increase their potential outcome considerably. The chances of both of them maximising their outcome are, potentially, doubled.

This, clearly, can only be accomplished through open diplomacy.

During the course of my diplomatic mission, then, it goes without saying that I shall always be practicing open diplomacy, meaning I will endeavour to keep the public fully informed at all times, at all points in the process.

And of course my saying this in advance, in public, is itself open diplomacy.

That too is game theory, after all.

For we Paschats, metacognition, cognitive (or metacognitive) empathy and game theory come naturally and instinctively to us.

To finish, an example with regards to the concept of ‘mutual assured destruction’ via nuclear exchange, which I studied quite closely when I was preparing the analysis report prompted by your Voyager probe’s golden record. That is to say, if player one fires nuclear weapons at player two, player two fires back and this hurts player one. Their ‘mutually assured destruction’ becomes the deterrent.

There is, however, a great flaw in this. What is commonly unrecognised in this concept is that this event comprises not one, but two moves. Player one fires first but then the game is paused. Player two has a clear decision to make – retaliate, or not retaliate. It should be clear that not retaliating is the better – indeed, the only – move to maximise outcome. Player one, having launched an unprovoked attack, has committed genocide. The goodness of normal human beings effects the predictable reaction, and player one – the named person who gave the order (let us say for instance the President of the United States) exposes himself to the entire world to be evil. If he does even make it down to his bunker in one piece, he would never be allowed out again. Thus, he personally suffers the ultimate retaliation, and his people are spared. If, however, player two fires back, then neither side are any good, and player one effectively ‘gets away with it’.

What should be the obvious solution to this, then, is for player two to inform player one of his move before player one makes his decision. Put simply, ‘we will never retaliate. In fact, we are decommissioning our nuclear weapons immediately. if you fire at us, you will be committing genocide on a defenceless people, and the world’s population will avenge us on you personally. So there is only one move left in this two move game, Mr. President, and that move is yours. Make your choice.’

If player one wishes to maximise his outcome, then his only option is to not fire. Better still, to also decommission his nuclear weapons and spend all that money on something a bit more emotionally mature instead.

Game theory, then, has just solved your nuclear weapons issue. It should all be quite clear that nuclear weapons are not a deterrent – can never be a deterrent – but are rather always a threat. America, indeed, is the only country in the world to have used nuclear weapons on a defenceless, innocent population, for no strategic reason (it did not shorten the war, despite what they tell you – Japan had been wanting to end the war all that year and had no real resources left with which to fight, but the peace terms demanded of them (Potsdam) were deliberately designed to be unacceptable). America’s use of those weapons was clearly designed to tell the rest of the world that their threat – not deterrent – of nuclear attack was real. There was no guesswork involved. Quite, given America’s shameful and genocidal record even using non-nuclear weapons should not give us cause for surprise. Of course they would use nuclear weapons, if they thought they could get away with it (for example, carrying out a false flag and blaming the ‘first strike’ on their enemy – Russia, perhaps; their launching of nuclear weapons could then be made to look like player two’s retaliation as the injured party. Indeed, America has a history of such false flags, so again, we should not be surprised here).

By ‘getting away with it’ we of course refer not necessarily to the country ‘America’, but to the named individuals holding their big boys’ book of nuclear codes (a phallic representation designed, perhaps, to make up for inadequacy or impotence of another kind?). If they were to give such an order, they, personally, would be known to the world, and humanity’s collective response would do the rest of the work for us.

Having said all of that, my dearest things, fear not, humanity. We would never let them do that to Gaia. They will find, were they ever to contemplate giving such an order, that those weapons will simply not work.

As we say on Nebthwt, there’s always a bigger nix.

I believe the Americans are about to find this out shortly. I sincerely hope their response is not hasty, nor in panic, but measured, considered well, and wise.